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Abstract
The ability of subjects to identify and reproduce brief temporal intervals is influenced by
many factors whether they be stimulus-based, task-based or subject-based. The current
study examines the role individual differences play in subsecond and suprasecond timing
judgments, using the schizoptypy personality scale as a test-case approach for quantifying
a broad range of individual differences. In two experiments, 129 (Experiment 1) and 141
(Experiment 2) subjects completed the O-LIFE personality questionnaire prior to performing
a modified temporal-bisection task. In the bisection task, subjects responded to two identical
instantiations of a luminance grating presented in a 4deg window, 4deg above fixation for
1.5 s (Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). Subjects initiated presentation with a button-
press, and released the button when they considered the stimulus to be half-way through
(750/1500 ms). Subjects were then asked to indicate their ‘most accurate estimate’ of the
two intervals. In this way we measure both performance on the task (a first-order measure)
and the subjects’ knowledge of their performance (a second-order measure). In Experiment
1 the effect of grating-drift and feedback on performance was also examined. Experiment 2
focused on the static/no-feedback condition. For the group data, Experiment 1 showed a
significant effect of presentation order in the baseline condition (no feedback), which disap-
peared when feedback was provided. Moving the stimulus had no effect on perceived dura-
tion. Experiment 2 showed no effect of stimulus presentation order. This elimination of the
subsecond order-effect was at the expense of accuracy, as the mid-point of the suprase-
cond interval was generally underestimated. Response precision increased as a proportion
of total duration, reducing the variance below that predicted by Weber’s law. This result is
consistent with a breakdown of the scalar properties of time perception in the early suprase-
cond range. All subjects showed good insight into their own performance, though that insight
did not necessarily correlate with the veridical bisection point. In terms of personality, we
found evidence of significant differences in performance along the Unusual Experiences
subscale, of most theoretical interest here, in the subsecond condition only. There was also
significant correlation with Impulsive Nonconformity and Cognitive Disorganisation in the
sub- and suprasecond conditions, respectively. Overall, these data support a partial dissoci-
ation of timing mechanisms at very short and slightly longer intervals. Further, these results
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suggest that perception is not the only critical mitigator of confidence in temporal experi-
ence, since individuals can effectively compensate for differences in perception at the level
of metacognition in early suprasecond time. Though there are individual differences in per-
formance, these are perhaps less than expected from previous reports and indicate an
effective timing mechanism dealing with brief durations independent of the influence of sig-
nificant personality trait differences.
Introduction
The experience of time and its passing is a pervasive, fundamental feature of conscious aware-
ness; one that has occupied experimental psychology as a discipline since its earliest pioneers
[1]. However, in spite of the wealth of research attempting to characterise the nature of tempo-
ral representation in humans and other animals [2], the underlying neural mechanisms
responsible for encoding interval duration remain obscure. The recent proliferation of books,
review articles, and special issues dealing with contemporary theoretical accounts of time per-
ception underscores both the substantial achievements that have been made over the past
three decades, and the considerable challenges that still remain [3–7].
One of the chief impediments to understanding the perceptual properties of time periods
spanning the milliseconds (i.e. ‘subsecond’ intervals) to seconds (i.e. ‘suprasecond’ intervals)
range is the extent to which different methodological paradigms give rise to divergent empiri-
cal data [8, 9]. Several authors [10, 11] have suggested that such inconsistencies might derive,
at least in part, from substantial (but as yet, largely uninvestigated) individual differences in
temporal cognition. In the work described here, we use a novel approach towards the measure-
ment of perceived duration that quantifies not only the individual’s perception of short periods
of time, but also their insight into the accuracy of such judgements. We then relate these mea-
sures to the personality construct of schizotypy as a means of assessing individual differences
in performance in the task across a spectrum of personality traits.
Individual differences in visual duration judgements
Individual differences in perception have recently gained attention as theoretically and experi-
mentally important factors in many aspects of sensory research [12–20], and time perception
is no different [10, 11]. Recent research has attempted to identify genetic and neurochemical
[21, 22], or structural and morphological [23, 24] factors that predict individual differences in
the accuracy and variability of interval timing judgements. Combining behavioural genetics
and neuroimaging approaches, Wiener and colleagues [25] found that such differences may be
partially attributed to a developmental polymorphism associated with decreased striatal D2
receptor density. They suggested that differences in the dopaminergic activation of frontostria-
tal circuitry, which constitutes a key network in many contemporary models of interval timing
[26, 27], might explain between-subject variation in the perception of short durations. First,
however, the extent and nature of those individual differences needs to be measured, which we
address here.
Interval timing and personality-based individual differences
A complementary approach to examining various physiological substrates is to measure sys-
tematic variability in temporal judgement tasks in relation to self-reported personality traits; a
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whole-of-system approach. To date, this approach has focused predominantly on personality
constructs that are considered to share features with clinical disorders (e.g., schizophrenia and
impulse control dysfunctions) thought to involve distorted temporal processing and dopami-
nergic dysregulation [28, 29]. However, recent efforts to map interval timing variability onto
such personality constructs have so far produced mixed results. For instance, Tsai and Yeh
[30] found that healthy adults who reported high trait-impulsivity were less sensitive to small
differences in durations ranging from 750 to 1350 ms than their low-scoring counterparts,
independent of any attentional effects. In contrast, Baumann and Odum [31] and Corvi and
colleagues [32] reported no evidence of association between psychometric indices of impulsiv-
ity and performance on suprasecond visual duration judgements using temporal-bisection (2s
and 4s standards [31]) and temporal-production tasks (60s production and 75s verbal estima-
tion [32]), respectively.
Schizotypy, a multidimensional construct encompassing a variety of experiences and dispo-
sitions reminiscent of psychotic-like phenomena [33], is another potential candidate for pre-
dicting individual differences in temporal cognition. Originally conceived as a neurobiological
susceptibility to schizophrenic disorder [34, 35] schizotypy has been construed more recently
as a personality trait that is continuously distributed throughout the general population [36];
one which is not necessarily indicative of latent psychopathology. On the contrary, some trait
features might confer certain adaptive advantages and an increasingly common concept in the
literature is that of the healthy schizotype and its relationship to creativity [37–40].
This broader, multidimensional conception of schizotypy is particularly appealing in the
context of delineating inter-individual differences in temporal cognition. First, its broad scope
enables the evaluation of timing variability across diverse populations. Second, mapping sys-
tematic timing differences as a function of schizotypal trait expression might reveal useful
insights about changes in temporal experience as normal trait variation transitions into psy-
chotic-like disturbance [41]. Finally, the trait’s complex structure (which incorporates a
dimension tapping impulsivity) is advantageous for assessing which specific personality com-
ponents are most relevant for predicting individual differences in duration perception.
Two studies to date have investigated variability of visual duration judgements as a function
of schizotypy. Sarkin and collagues [42] reported no difference in the performance of high- vs.
low-scoring young adults attempting to reproduce intervals spanning 1 to 25 s. It should be
noted, however, that this study involved a coarse-grained classification of participants based
on a composite psychometric score. Such aggregate measures are problematic insofar as they
may lack sensitivity to between-subject differences that systematically co-vary with a particular
trait dimension. More recently, Reed and Randell [43] reported two temporal-bisection experi-
ments in which participants’ ability to correctly categorise probe stimuli as being more similar
to either a short or a long reference interval (using two reference pairs of 200/800ms or 300/
900ms), was analysed in relation to scores on the Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and
Experiences—Brief Version (O-LIFE(B) [44]). This study revealed significant differences in
the apparent duration of these subsecond intervals as judged by high- versus low-scorers on
the Unusual Experiences subscale (UnEx) with high-scorers participants tending to categorise
probes more accurately than their low-scoring counterparts. No other between-group differ-
ences in task performance were detected across the remaining subscales.
Reed and Randell’s [43] results indicate that systematic variation in interval timing might
be accounted for by a susceptibility or propensity towards unusual beliefs (e.g., magical idea-
tion) and aberrant perceptual experiences (e.g., hallucinatory phenomena). Alongside evi-
dence that the early visual processing deficits postulated in schizophrenia also extend (albeit in
an attenuated fashion) to individuals who score highly on measures of schizotypy [45–47]; that
such visual impairments may arise due to temporal processing disturbances [48]; and, finally,
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that high-UnEx scores predict diminished sensitivity to visual stimuli [15], these data are sug-
gestive of a common linkage between anomalous visual experiences and distorted temporal
representations in the contexts of schizotypy and schizophrenia. This motivates us to examine
whether healthy adults who are prone to aberrant visual sensations (i.e. score highly on the
UnEx dimension of schizotypy) also manifest subtle differences in duration judgements (i.e.
the accuracy and variability of interval estimates), as compared to individuals who are less
prone to such experiences.
Measuring confidence in temporal judgment
In addition to investigating whether duration judgements co-vary with profiles of schizoty-
pal trait expression, we also sought to assess the reliability with which individuals were able
to evaluate the relative accuracy of their interval estimates. To our knowledge, no previous
attempts have been made to quantify variability in individuals’ (second-order) appraisal of
their own (first-order) performance on a temporal estimation task. It seems plausible how-
ever that differences in timing ability might derive in part from the extent to which individu-
als have consistent and accurate access to their internal representations of time. The
observation that temporal estimation accuracy is improved by the provision of explicit feed-
back [49] implies that interval timing is modulated to some extent by knowledge of one’s
objective timing performance. However, this study showed that participants who performed
less accurately on the temporal discrimination task benefited less from feedback than partici-
pants who performed more accurately on the task. This finding suggests that differences in
the capacity to bring one’s metacognitive or introspective insight to bear on a temporal esti-
mation task might go some way to explaining the variable patterns of interval timing noted
across individuals.
The current study
From a general perspective, we have recently shown how a personality trait-driven approach
can be informative in delineating individual differences in the perception of meaning in spa-
tially noisy patterns [15]. Taking a similar approach here, rather than studying personality per
se, we are primarily interested in examining how individual differences in timing judgments
may correlate with an individual’s particular personality traits. We chose schizotypy as a mea-
sure of personality for the reasons outlined above, but stress that this study is primarily inter-
ested in investigating the extent to which patterns of variance in individual timing
performance can be predicted by personality factors, with only a secondary interest in such
factors themselves.
In short, this study presents data from two experiments in which a novel variation of the
temporal-bisection task was used to investigate whether individual differences in temporal
estimation and metacognition can be related to schizotypy. In Experiment 1, we explored the
influence of psychophysical factors (stimulus order, stimulus motion, metacognitive feedback)
on the estimation of a subsecond bisection-point target, and whether variance in these effects
can be explained by self-report measures of schizotypy. We also investigated whether we could
enhance the sensitivity of our analysis by increasing the granularity of the response choices
availed by the personality measure (i.e. replacing binary response options with a Likert-scale).
Experiment 2 builds on these findings by extending the logic of this paradigm to the suprase-
cond domain. Using schizotypy as a test case, we show how individual differences in first- and
second-order timing (i.e. duration estimation and its retrospective appraisal, respectively) can
be distinguished and assessed in relation to personality factors.
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General methodology
This section outlines the methodological features that were consistent across both experi-
ments; experiment-specific details are presented in sections 3.1 and 4.1 for Experiments 1 and
2 respectively.
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences’ first-year
programme in return for course credit. All participants reported normal (or corrected-to-nor-
mal) vision, and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. Both studies were approved
by the Human Ethics Advisory Group at the University of Melbourne and each participant
provided written consent for participation and publication of their (anonymous) data. No
individual participated in both experiments.
Psychophysics
Apparatus and stimuli. Visual stimuli were generated using the Psychophysics Toolbox,
Version 3 [50] in MATLAB Version 7.10.0 (The MathWorks1 Inc., Natick, MA). They were
displayed on a calibrated 21-inch Sony Multiscan1 G520 CRT monitor (resolution = 1600 x
1200 pixels, frame rate = 100 Hz, mean luminance = 40 cd/m2, CIE co-ordinates [x = 0.333,
y = 0.377]) within a stationary circular envelope (diameter = 4˚ of visual angle) located 4˚
above a central fixation spot. Interval estimates were recorded via a calibrated Cedrus RB-530
response pad (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA).
Psychophysical procedure. We implemented a modified version of a standard temporal-
bisection task which was designed to to derive objective measures of first- and second-order
temporal judgements in our participants. Each trial involved a (first-order) time estimation
component in which participants were required to bisect two intervals of the same duration,
and a (second-order) metacognitive appraisal component in which participants were required
to identify which of the two preceding bisection estimates was closest to the predefined target
duration (i.e. the verdical bisection-point). This hybrid paradigm can, we argue, be thought of
as the combination of a temporal-bisection and interval-reproduction task forming the first-
order judgement followed by a second-order forced-choice confidence judgement [51]. Since
we asked the participants to bisect the interval (through their button-press response) we will
describe the data, and the over- or under-estimation of the veridical mid-point of each interval,
in terms of a bisection rather than a production. So, for example, if a subject identifies the
mid-point of the interval as being prior to the actual mid-point, we consider this to be an
underestimation of time in the sense that the whole interval (bisection point x 2) would be
experienced as being shorter than it actually is, though this could also be considered to be an
overestimation of the passage of time in a (re)production scenario. A schematic representation
of the generic trial structure is depicted in Fig 1.
All trials consisted of two identical intervals (one of which is represented in Fig 1), each
being demarcated through the continuous presentation of the test stimulus; the temporal cue
was therefore solely visual. The participant was told the interval duration and that they were
required to estimate half of this, bisecting the period that the stimulus was present on the
screen. The first interval was initiated when the participant depressed the response pad button.
A random delay offset ranging from 0 to 250 ms was inserted after the button press prior to
the appearance of the stimulus to avoid the use of rhythm in the task (which we found made it
trivial). Upon the appearance of the stimulus, the participant maintained button depression
until the interval mid-point, when they released the button. The stimulus remained on-screen
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until the full duration of the interval had elapsed. This procedure was then repeated for the sec-
ond interval estimate following a 500 ms inter-stimulus interval.
After making a pair of bisection-point estimates, participants were prompted to make a
two-alternative forced choice response via the keyboard arrow keys to indicate which of their
estimates they deemed closest to the target duration; their ‘Best’ estimate. This retrospective
judgement constituted the temporal metacognition component of the task. This feature of the
paradigm allows partitioning of the first-order estimate data according to the participant’s sub-
jective appraisal of their performance on each trial, thus affording an implicit, objective mea-
sure of temporal confidence (see section 2.5 for further discussion). It also enabled us to
introduce feedback indicating whether the participant had correctly identified the more accu-
rate of their paired estimates. It is only this aspect of the task on which were able, or wanted, to
provide feedback on. The feedback does not provide any cue as to the accuracy of the better
response per se as it can only indicate which of the pair of responses was closest to the veridical
mid-point. While this could be used to hone subsequent the estimate after each pair, as we
expect and indeed consider an important feature of the paradigm, it does not give a sign or
magnitude of ‘error’ cue to the participant.
Fig 1. Schematic illustration of the basic sequence of events during a modified temporal-bisection task trial. Duration of interval presentation
varied across experiments (1500 vs. 3000 ms). Note, a feedback tone indicating whether the participant had correctly identified which bisection estimate
was more accurate was provided at the end of each trial during the Feedback condition of Experiment 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g001
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Questionnaire materials
Schizotypy was assessed using the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences
(O-LIFE) [52], a 104-item questionnaire consisting of four subscales. The Unusual Experiences
(UnEx) scale contains items pertaining to aberrant perceptions, magical ideation, and irratio-
nal beliefs (e.g., ‘When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there’s
nothing there?’). The Cognitive Disorganisation (CogDis) scale relates to difficulties with
attentional focus and decision-making, as well as social anxiety (e.g., ‘Do you often have diffi-
culties in controlling your thoughts?’). The Introvertive Anhedonia (IntAn) scale contains
items that reflect preferences for independence and solitude over intimacy and social activity
(e.g., ‘Are you much too independent to really get involved with other people?’). The Impulsive
Nonconformity (ImpNon) scale taps features of disinhibition, including eccentric and antiso-
cial behaviour (e.g., ‘Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking?’). We
used both the traditional binary yes/no response questionnaire and a modified 1–6 Likert-
scale version, splitting the participants into two randomly assigned groups. A secondary aspect
of our interest here is to examine the characteristics of using a more graded range of possible
responses in the questionnaire (Experiment 1).
General procedure
Participants attended a single test session at the Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences
Vision and Attention Laboratory. Following consent procedures, participants were seated at a
computer station and instructed to complete an online version of the O-LIFE at their own
pace. This questionnaire required approximately 15–20 minutes to complete. Participants
were then taken to a semi-darkened experimental booth (ambient luminance approximately
10 cd/m2) to perform the modified temporal-bisection task. This took approximately 45 min-
utes to complete.
Data analysis
Statistical analyses were conducted using R version 3.4.0 (R Core Team, 2017). Since standard
parametric methods are overly sensitive to outliers and departures from normality [53, 54],
robust statistical measures of location and association were favoured. M-estimators based on
Huber’s ψ function were selected on account of their higher breakdown point and greater
robustness to skewness. These estimators were used in conjunction with percentile bootstrap
techniques to calculate 95% confidence intervals. This methodological approach has the added
advantages of performing well in the context of heteroscedasticity and small sample size [54].
The general analysis strategy can be decomposed into two stages, each of which examined
both the estimation and metacognition components of the task. First, psychophysical perfor-
mance trends were investigated at the group level. This analysis was designed to explore how
various factors (e.g., interval duration, stimulus motion, metacognitive feedback) influenced
general patterns of temporal estimation, independent of personality differences. Averages of
first and second interval bisection-point estimates, and the variance associated with these esti-
mates, were computed and compared for within-subject order effects using a one-step M-
estimator.
To examine group-level trends on the metacognitive component of the task, paired interval
estimates were re-sorted into two categories: those estimates the subject classified as being the
more accurate of the pair (i.e. closer to the mid-point), and remaining (worse) estimates.
These are termed Subjective Best and Subjective Worst hereafter, and each set has a mean and
variance associated with it in exactly the same way as the Interval 1 and Interval 2 estimates
above do. So, the term ‘Subject Best variance’, for example, refers to the variance of the
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bisection-point estimates judged to be subjectively better (more accurate) by a given partici-
pant for a given condition. Averages of these subjectively sorted bisection-point estimates, and
the variance associated with these estimates, were then compared using the M-estimator pro-
cedure exactly as above.
Psychophysical data were analysed in relation to individual scores on each of the four
O-LIFE subscales in order to examine whether bisection-point estimation and appraisal varied
as a function of schizotypal trait expression. Mean and variance estimates were averaged across
Intervals 1 and 2 to summarise temporal estimation performance. Mean bisection-point esti-
mates were also transformed into a measure of absolute error (unsigned value of the mean esti-
mated bisection-point subtracted from the actual mid-point). These three summary measures
were then assessed for evidence of dependency on each of the four O-LIFE subscales using the
percentage bend correlation test, a robust measure of correlation [54]. Both Binary and Likert-
scale O-LIFE groups were considered individually for the analysis and indicated as such in the
results.
Correlations between O-LIFE scores and the variance of Subjective Best estimates were also
calculated to assess whether schizotypal personality dimensions were associated with Best/
Worst estimate discrimination precision. Paired interval estimates were then re-sorted accord-
ing to which estimate was actually closest to the mid-point, and the variance of this ‘Ideal’ best
estimate (Ideal Best) calculated. Because this estimate is calculated from the individual esti-
mates of each subject for each condition, this accords well with Ideal Observer Theory and can
be accurately expressed as the Ideal Observer estimate [55]. This estimate was then divided by
the Subjective Best variance to yield an index of metacognitive acuity (Metacognitive Index),
where a value of 1 indicated perfect discrimination performance. This value was also correlated
with the O-LIFE subscale scores.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to reveal general performance trends on the temporal-bisection
task when the target duration was in the subsecond range (i.e. 750 ms). At the first-order level,
stimulus presentation was manipulated in order to assess whether spatially localised stimulus
drift systematically affected the magnitude of duration estimates. Dynamic stimuli have been
shown to dilate the apparent duration of subsecond intervals as compared to stationary equiva-
lents [56–58]. At the second-order level, external feedback was provided in one condition in
order to assess how explicit information pertaining to discrimination accuracy affected perfor-
mance on the metacognitive component of the task.
As indicated above, we were also interested in assessing whether a Likert-scaled version of
the O-LIFE is more sensitive to (and hence, a more robust predictor of) interval timing differ-
ences across schizotypal trait profiles, as has been shown in other studies [59, 60]. As in these
cited studies, this aspect of our investigation was motivated by both theoretical and empirical
concerns. On the one hand, a Likert-scaled response format is more conceptually aligned with
the notion of schizotypy as a continuous spectrum than the standard binary format; on the
other hand, investigations of alternative psychometric measures of psychosis-proneness have
indicated that Likert-scaled response formats enhance sensitivity to individual variation along
trait dimensions [61–63]. We present a direct comparison of the two response scales here to
justify and facilitate its potential future use. We also analyse critical data in equivalent binary
terms in the Supporting Information provided for parity with the literature and to assure the
reader that our conclusions based on the Likert- scaled responses are consistent and valid.
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Methodological specifics
129 undergraduate students (90 females) aged 17 to 34 years (M = 19.28 years, SD = 2.11) were
randomly assigned to either a Feedback or a No-Feedback version of the temporal-bisection
task. In both conditions, participants were required to bisect 1500 ms intervals presented
across 4 blocks of 50 trials. While two blocks featured static stimulus presentations, the
remainder consisted of trials in which stimuli appeared to drift horizontally (either left or
right, randomised across trials) within the presentation envelope at a temporal frequency of 10
Hz (+/- 0-2Hz). Order of block presentation was counterbalanced. Additionally, participants
in the Feedback condition heard a tone at the end of each trial that indicated whether they had
correctly nominated the more accurate of their two estimates; no information about the abso-
lute duration of bisection estimates was provided. Participants were supervised while perform-
ing 5 practice trials prior to each block to ensure that task instructions were understood.
Participants also completed either a binary (n = 66) or Likert-scaled (n = 63) version of the
O-LIFE. For the (standard) binary format, participants selected either “Yes” (scored as 1) or
“No” (scored as 0) in response to inventory items. For the Likert-scaled format, participants
rated their agreement with each item on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to
6 (“strongly agree”). Scores for each subscale are calculated following the reverse coding of
negatively keyed items, with higher subscale scores indicative of higher expression of the schi-
zotypal trait component. The relation between temporal-bisection task performance and per-
sonality was investigated separately for each version of the O-LIFE.
Overall, therefore, there were four experimental groups with N30 in each group: No-
Feedback + Binary O-LIFE, Feedback + Binary O-LIFE, No-Feedback + Likert O-LIFE, and
Feedback + Likert O-LIFE. All subjects made temporal judgements on both static and drifting
stimuli though the order was randomised between subjects.
This experiment received approval from the University of Melbourne Human Research
Ethics Committee (Ethics ID: 1033610.1).
Results and discussion
Psychophysical data were missing for 3 individuals from the Binary O-LIFE group, hence
these participants were excluded from all analyses involving bisection-point estimation. A fur-
ther 5 participants failed to register a minimum of 50 valid trials (i.e. bisection-point estimates
between 0 and 1500 ms), and were therefore also excluded from analysis. Of the remaining 121
participants, 59 belonged to the Binary O-LIFE group (32 Feedback condition); 62 belonged to
the Likert O-LIFE group (33 Feedback condition).
Psychophysical data. Summary data of group-level task performance are presented in Fig
2. Within-subjects comparisons revealed that Interval 1 bisection-point estimates for static sti-
muli were on average 26.45 ms shorter than Interval 2 (p = .002, 95% CI [10.16, 42.31]).
Although contrary to standard accounts of neural coding efficiency, which predict that
repeated exposure to identical stimuli elicits diminished neural activity or ‘repetition suppres-
sion’ [64], this finding is consistent with previous observations that the first of a pair of dura-
tion estimates is experienced as being briefer than the second interval [56, 65]. Interestingly,
this effect was eliminated by the provision of feedback (p = .722, 95% CI [-10.82, 15.38]),
which resulted in elevated (i.e. longer) Interval 1 estimates relative to the No-Feedback condi-
tion (p = .021, 95% CI [13.31, 130.62]). There were no differences in interval estimate variances
within or across feedback conditions (all ps .09).
Bisection-point estimation did not significantly differ as a function of stimulus motion
(Static vs. Drift), both in terms of mean duration (all ps> .36) and variance (all ps .15).
Although this observation seems inconsistent with previous reports of motion (or temporal
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frequency) induced changes in duration perception, this divergence is most likely attributable
to a unique methodological feature of the current paradigm. Unlike previous experiments,
which featured either direct (i.e. intra-trial) comparisons [56, 57] or temporal reproductions
[57, 58] of static versus drifting stimuli, the bisection task required participants to build up an
internal representation of interval duration in relation to stimulus onset and offset. The lack of
any discernible within-subject differences in Static vs. Drift condition duration estimates sug-
gests that participants calibrated their estimation of the bisection-point not only in terms of
the time elapsed since stimulus onset (as required by the standard method of reproduction),
but also in relation to time elapsed between the button release and stimulus offset. As such,
any absolute distortion of apparent duration would have been cancelled out by the repeated
comparison (and attempted minimisation) of the difference in the duration of the pre- and
post-bisection phases of the stimulus interval. This suggestion is consistent with subjective
report subsequent to performing the experiment.
Bisection-point estimate pairs were re-sorted according to the Best/Worst estimate discrim-
ination judgement, and the mean and variance of these estimates re-calculated for each partici-
pant. Within-subjects analyses revealed that the mean duration of individuals’ Subjective Best
Fig 2. Summary of first-order temporal estimation performance (top row: mean bisection-point duration; bottom row: mean bisection-point
variance) across all conditions of the 1500 ms modified temporal-bisection task. Variance data have been transformed into standard deviations for
convenience of figure scaling. Error bars represent the standard deviation of the sample mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g002
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estimates did not significantly differ from that of their Subjective Worst estimates in either
No-Feedback condition (ps> .07). However, Subjective Best estimates were on average 15.79
ms longer for static stimuli (p = .022, 95% CI [1.79, 31.38]), and 18.47 ms longer for drifting
stimuli (p = .024, 95% CI [2.26, 37.44]), when feedback on discrimination accuracy was pro-
vided (Fig 3, top row). This observation is consistent with evidence from the first-order data
that feedback on the correctness of their accuracy judgements biased participants towards lon-
ger estimate durations.
In line with what we would expect if the participant had insight into their own perfor-
mance, the variance of Subjective Best estimates was significantly reduced in comparison to
Subjective Worst estimates in the No-Feedback conditions (Static: p< .001, 95% CI [13311,
24986]; Drift: p< .001, 95% CI [10670, 20399]). This finding indicates that participants were
generally able to arbitrate the relative accuracy of their paired estimates with some degree of
proficiency. The difference between Subjective Best/Worst estimate variances was amplified in
the Feedback conditions (Static: p< .001, 95% CI [28116, 52687]; Drift: p< .001, 95% CI
[23288, 41974]), suggesting the precision of temporal metacognitive discrimination judge-
ments is improved when internal representations of duration are supplemented with external
information regarding objective timing performance (Fig 3, bottom row).
Personality data. Binary O-LIFE scores were broadly comparable to previously reported
norms [66]. Likert-scaled responses demonstrated a similar pattern of subscale response distri-
butions and intercorrelations to those reported for the standard format (Fig 4). Interestingly,
the Likert-scaled inventory tended to elicit less extreme scores relative to the limits of each sub-
scale. It also tended to amplify the strength of significant intercorrelations between UnEx
scores and responses on both the CogDis (rpb = .50, p< .001, 95% CI [.26, .70]) and ImpNon
(rpb = .65, p< .001, 95% CI [.47, .78]) subscales. We consider that these are both positive fea-
tures of the novel modification of the questionnaire. In what follows, analyses of the relation
between task performance and O-LIFE subscale scores are reported separately for each
O-LIFE response format group.
There was no evidence of association between binary response scores on any of the four
O-LIFE subscales and either the mean estimate duration (all ps> .35), absolute error (all ps>
.10), or variance (all ps> .06), irrespective of feedback condition. Neither were there any sig-
nificant correlations with Subjective Best variances in both the No-Feedback and Feedback
conditions (all ps .20). The Metacognitive Index was negatively correlated with ImpNon (rpb
= -.41, p = .040, 95% CI [-.68, -.02]), suggesting that individuals with higher degrees of impul-
sivity-related characteristics manifest a reduced capacity to discriminate the more accurate of
their paired interval estimates. Metacognition was not significantly associated with any of the
remaining three subscales (all ps .13).
The Likert-scaled O-LIFE data likewise provided no evidence of association with either
mean estimate duration or estimate variance, irrespective of feedback condition (all ps> .19).
However, UnEx was positively correlated with the absolute error of the bisection-point esti-
mate in the No-Feedback condition (rpb = .46, p = .010, 95% CI [.12, .76]), suggesting that indi-
viduals with higher UnEx scores tended to make less accurate bisection-point estimates when
external information concerning the accuracy of their temporal metacognitive judgements
was not available. The lack of any clear trend towards either the under- or overestimation of
the target duration is consistent with findings in the schizophrenia literature [67]. There was
no evidence of any association between UnEx scores and average estimate errors in the Feed-
back condition (rpb = .04, p = .841, 95% CI [-.32, .39]), which is consistent with the earlier
observation that feedback tends to induce additional first-order estimate error as participants
attempt to minimise the difference in the duration of estimate pairs. Remaining subscales were
uncorrelated with absolute error estimates across both feedback conditions (all ps> .17).
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Likert-scaled UnEx scores were positively correlated with Subjective Best variances in both
the No-Feedback (rpb = .47, p = .027, 95% CI [.09, .74]) and Feedback (rpb = .35, p = .040, 95%
CI [.02, .63]) conditions. ImpNon was also positively associated with Subjective Best variance
in the No-Feedback condition (rpb = .43, p = .040, 95% CI [.02, .76]) only. Given the absence of
any significant correlation between the first-order variance of bisection-point estimates and
O-LIFE subscale scores, these findings suggest that greater expression of UnEx and ImpNon
characteristics coincide with a reduction in the degree of confidence with which one can intro-
spectively appraise one’s performance on the subsecond bisection task. Evidence of negative
correlations between Metacognitive Index and both UnEx (rpb = -.34, p = .077, 95% CI [-.64,
.05]) and ImpNon (rpb = -.37, p = .047, 95% CI [-.70, -.01]), albeit at trend level in the former,
tentatively corroborate the link between the expression of these trait components and dimin-
ished temporal metacognitive sensitivity (Fig 5). By contrast, CogDis and IntAn scores were
uncorrelated with both the Subjective Best variance (all ps> .12) and Metacognitive Index (all
ps> .45).
Fig 3. Summary of second-order temporal estimation performance (top row: mean duration of Subjective Best/Worst estimates; bottom row:
variance of Subjective Best/Worst estimates across participants) across all conditions of the 1500 ms modified temporal-bisection task. For
box plots, thick horizontal line indicates median variance estimate; lower and upper hinges correspond to first and third quartiles, respectively; lower
and upper whiskers extend to furthest estimate within 1.5 x interquartile range from the lower and upper hinges, respectively; points indicate outliers.
Variance estimates transformed into standard deviations for convenience of figure scaling.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g003
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Fig 4. Summary of O-LIFE subscale scores (top row: distribution of subscale scores; bottom row: intercorrelations between subscale scores) as a
function of inventory response format. For box plots, thick horizontal line indicates median subscale score; lower and upper hinges correspond to first
and third quartiles, respectively; lower and upper whiskers extend to the furthest score within 1.5 x interquartile range from the lower and upper hinges,
respectively; points indicate outliers. Y-axes scaled according to range of possible scores afforded by each format. For correlation plots, strength of
correlation indicated along Y-axis. UnEx: Unusual Experiences; CogDis: Cognitive Disorganisation; IntAn: Introspective Anhedonia; ImpNon:
Impulsive Nonconformity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g004
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As participant responses on the UnEx and ImpNon scales were highly intercorrelated (rpb =
.58, p = .003, 95% CI [.24, .81]), a robust regression analysis was conducted to investigate the
extent to which these two scales independently predicted Subjective Best variance. Robust F
tests indicated that there was a substantial amount of shared variance between UnEx and
ImpNon: while UnEx significantly predicted Subjective Best variance in the No-Feedback con-
dition (F = 4.74, p = .039), including ImpNon within the model rendered both predictors non-
significant (all ps> .10). This finding implies that ImpNon subscale scores did not account for
a significant proportion of the variance in Subjective Best judgements over and above that
accounted for by UnEx scores at this short duration.
Summary of Experiment 1. The results reported above reveal that the modified tempo-
ral-bisection task is sensitive to group-level order-effects, and that feedback concerning sec-
ond-order judgement influences first-order estimate behaviour. In contrast, the task was
insensitive to previously-demonstrated effects of stimulus motion on temporal estimation. We
argue that this latter result arises from the structure of task, suggesting that bisection-point
estimates are judged relative to both the beginning and end of each interval.
Fig 5. Scatter plots indicating association between O-LIFE subscale scores (Likert-scale response group) and Metacognitive Index score (where 1
corresponds to perfect discrimination of Best/Worst estimates). Blue line indicates robust linear model fit; grey zone indicates standard error of
model fit. UnEx: Unusual Experiences; CogDis: Cognitive Disorganisation; IntAn: Introspective Anhedonia; ImpNon: Impulsive Nonconformity; MCI:
Metacognitive Index.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g005
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Feedback increased the average duration of Interval 1 estimates, reducing the discrepancy
between estimate pairs. Interestingly, indirect information concerning the relative accuracy of
a pair of bisection-point estimates (i.e. whether the estimate that was believed to better approx-
imate the target duration was indeed more accurate) was sufficient to influence first-order esti-
mation performance, biasing subjects towards longer bisection-point estimates. Feedback also
served to sharpen the distinction between Best and Worst estimate variance, such that Best
estimates where distributed about a much tighter temporal range.
While the binary version of the O-LIFE resulted in virtually no evidence of association
between bisection task performance and personality, Likert-scaled responses revealed evidence
of selective associations involving the UnEx and ImpNon subscales. These findings are broadly
accordant with previous literature implicating psychosis-proneness and impulsivity to altered
temporal processing. Interestingly, the modified temporal-bisection task revealed evidence of
positive associations between these subscales and second-order estimate variance (Best/Worst,
MCI), despite the absence of any consistent association at the first-order level with either
under- or over-estimation of the bisection-point, and only UnExp being (positively) correlated
with the absolute error. This result speaks to the task’s capacity to uncover dissociations
between one’s interval timing performance, and the metacognitive appraisal of one’s
performance.
Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether trends observed in Experiment 1 could be
replicated with a suprasecond bisection-point target (i.e. 1500 ms). Previous studies have indi-
cated that the neuroanatomical bases and neurocognitive mechanisms underpinning suprase-
cond interval timing are (at least partially) dissociated from those mediating subsecond
temporal judgements [24, 68, 69], so it makes sense to examine whether the pattern of results
observed in Experiment 1 extend into the suprasecond domain.
In this experiment, all participants completed the Likert-scaled O-LIFE and the Static/No-
Feedback condition of the modified temporal-bisection task. We focused on this condition
exclusively in order to maximise power, since longer interval estimates are associated with
greater variability on account of the scalar property of duration perception according to
Weber’s law for time, which stipulates a linear increase in estimate variability as a function of
temporal magnitude [70]. We are confident the Likert-scaled version of the O-LIFE provides a
usefully more nuanced version of the binary-scale while maintaining fundamentally the same
characteristics. Furthermore, since Experiment 1 indicated that our modified version of the
temporal-bisection task is insensitive to motion-induced changes in duration perception,
there was no rationale for repeating this manipulation.
Methodological specifics
141 undergraduate students (94 females) aged 17 to 41 years (M = 19.37 years, SD = 3.09) par-
ticipated in Experiment 2. All participants completed the Likert-scaled version of the O-LIFE
prior to the psychophysics. The stimuli and test conditions for the suprasecond task were simi-
lar to those described for the Static/No-Feedback condition of Experiment 1, with the excep-
tion that the stimulus was presented for a duration of 3000 ms rather than 1500 ms. The task
was again divided into four self-paced blocks of 50 trials. Participants performed 5 supervised
practice trials prior to commencing the task.
This experiment received approval from the University of Melbourne Human Research
Ethics Committee (Ethics ID: 1339962.2).
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Results and discussion
All participants produced a sufficient number of valid temporal estimates for inclusion within
the analysis.
Psychophysical data. Although within-subjects comparisons of mean bisection-point
estimates indicated that Interval 1 durations were on average 6.62 ms shorter than Interval 2,
this difference was non-significant (p = .206, 95% CI [-16.66, 3.42]). Within-subjects compari-
sons of estimate variances were also non-significant across Intervals 1 and 2 (p = .274, 95% CI
[-1106, 4502]), as per Experiment 1.
Referring to Fig 6, participants undertaking the suprasecond task tended to underestimate
the target duration (top left panel), and demonstrated relatively less variability (as a proportion
of target duration; i.e. (estimate duration / mid-point target) -1) in the spread of their mean
interval estimates (top right panel), than participants completing the subsecond task. Addi-
tionally, although variance of interval estimation was clearly elevated in the suprasecond task
(bottom left panel), the extent of this increase (bottom right panel) was less than would be
expected on the basis of Weber’s law (which predicts a constant coefficient of variation (i.e.
standard deviation of estimate durations / mean estimate duration) across different target
durations). While contrary to the widespread assumption that short duration interval timing
conforms to Weber’s law, this observation is consistent with a growing body of literature posit-
ing the breakdown of the scalar property in the early suprasecond range [71]. Reanalysis of the
above comparisons using only the first 2 blocks of data collected during Experiment 2 (i.e. the
same number of trials completed in the corresponding condition of Experiment 1) indicated
that these effects were not simply the consequence of additional task practice (see Supporting
Information).
In contrast to Experiment 1, Subjective Best estimates were shorter than Subjective Worst
estimates by an average of 37.80 ms (p< .001, 95% CI [26.42, 50.38]). Since Subjective Worst
estimates tended to be closer to the target duration, this finding is indicative of a group-level
bias in favour of objectively shorter interval durations (corresponding to a dilation of apparent
duration). As in Experiment 1 and in line with expectations, Subjective Best estimates were on
average markedly less variable than Subjective Worst estimates (p< .001, 95% CI [23017,
29985]; Fig 7, bottom left panel). The relative spread of group variability (as indexed by the
coefficient of variation) was reduced for both interval categories in comparison to the subse-
cond task (Fig 7, bottom right panel), which follows from the reduced degree of first-order
estimate variability noted above.
Personality data. Scores on the UnEx scale tended to be higher, and CogDis scores more
broadly distributed, than those registered in the Likert-scaled O-LIFE administered in Experi-
ment 1. Response distributions across the IntAn and ImpNon scales were similarly distributed
across both groups (Fig 8, left panel). Positive correlations between UnEx and CogDis (rpb =
.41, p< .001, 95% CI [.26, .55]), UnEx and ImpNon (rpb = .34, p< .001, 95% CI [.19, .47]), and
CogDis and ImpNon (rpb = .23, p = .010, 95% CI [.07, .39]) (Fig 8, right panel) replicated those
found in Experiment 1 and mirror reported norms well [66]. A significant correlation between
CogDis and IntAn also emerged (rpb = .26, p = .007, 95% CI [.09, .40]). We include a compari-
son of O-LIFE responses across experiments with all data converted into binary format in the
Appendix as a check of this likert-scored version of the questionnaire.
O-LIFE subscale scores were not associated with either mean estimate duration (all ps>
.18) or absolute error (all ps> .61). Only CogDis trended towards positive correlation with
estimate variance (rpb = .15, p = .060, 95% CI [0, .31]; all other ps> .17). CogDis was also posi-
tively associated with Subjective Best variance (rpb = .18, p = .010, 95% CI [.02, .33]); no other
scale demonstrated evidence of a substantive relationship (all ps> .17). Proportional variance
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associated with Best/Worst estimate discriminations (Metacognitive Index value) was uncorre-
lated with any of the four subscales (all ps> .43). This latter result suggests that the positive
association noted between CogDis and Subjective Best variance most likely issues from a gen-
eral tendency towards increased estimate variability (note the similarity of the estimated coeffi-
cients and confidence intervals), rather than any substantive difference in the nature of
temporal metacognitive judgement.
Given the interesting possibility, raised by one of our referees, that the effects observed in
the Likert-scale group from Experiment 1 were driven by the conjunction of UnEx and
ImpNon trait characteristics, and that analogous effects may have been masked in Experiment
2 by the inclusion of individuals who did not show similar degrees of UnEx and ImpNon
covariance, we conducted a subgroup analysis focusing on these two scales. We selected partic-
ipants by calculating median splits of UnEx and ImpNon scores, and retaining only those indi-
viduals who fell the same side of the median on both subscales. This procedure resulted in a
Fig 6. Comparison of first-order timing performance on the suprasecond (3000 ms) modified temporal-bisection task with the homologous
condition of the subsecond (1500 ms) task in Experiment 1. Left column: Mean duration (top panel) and variance (bottom panel) of bisection-point
estimates across experiments. Bar chart error bars indicate standard deviation of the sample mean. Right column: Mean estimate error (top panel) and
variance (bottom panel) relative to target duration. For box plots, thick horizontal line indicates median estimate; lower and upper hinges correspond to
first and third quartiles, respectively; lower and upper whiskers extend to furthest estimate within 1.5 x interquartile range from the lower and upper
hinges, respectively; points indicate outliers. See main text for details.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g006
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subgroup of 87 participants whose UnEx and ImpNon scores were strongly positively corre-
lated (rpb = .83, p< .001, 95% CI [.78, .88]). Repeated analyses revealed no evidence that the
effects obtained in Experiment 1 were replicated in this subgroup (all ps> .42), indicating that
the confluence of UnEx and ImpNon trait expression did not significantly modulate suprase-
cond temporal judgement.
General discussion
The two experiments reported here present an analysis of group-level performance and per-
sonality-based differences in the ability to bisect brief temporal intervals. In general, partici-
pants learned to perform the task relatively well; very few individuals were excluded from
analysis due to an insufficient quantity of valid estimates, and most individuals showed some
degree of proficiency in appraising the accuracy of their estimates. Although the subsecond
bisection task revealed evidence of systematic differences in both the first- and second-order
Fig 7. Comparison of second-order timing performance on the suprasecond (3000 ms) modified temporal-bisection task with the homologous
condition of the subsecond (1500 ms) task in Experiment 1. Left column: Mean duration (top panel) and group-level distribution of variances
(bottom panel) of Subjective Best/Worst estimates across experiments. Bar chart error bars indicate standard deviation of the sample mean. Right
column: Mean error (top panel) and variance (bottom panel) of Subjective Best/Worst estimates relative to target duration. For box plots, thick
horizontal line indicates median estimate; lower and upper hinges correspond to first and third quartiles, respectively; lower and upper whiskers extend
to furthest estimate within 1.5 x interquartile range from the lower and upper hinges, respectively; points indicate outliers. See main text for details.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g007
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temporal judgments of individuals who reported higher degrees of Unusual Experiences and
Impulsive Nonconformity, these effects were not evident in the suprasecond task. Further-
more, Experiment 1 also provided evidence that the Likert-scaled version of the O-LIFE may
provide a more sensitive measure of schizotypal characteristics (or at least, of the trait features
that predict timing differences) in healthy young adults compared to the standard (binary)
response format. This is consistent with the conclusions arising from a series of studies in
insight and problem solving [59, 60] and other work on hallucination-proneness ongoing in
the lab.
In the discussion that follows, implications of the group-level psychophysical data are dealt
with first, followed by our interpretation of the results concerning schizotypy and temporal
judgement.
Psychophysical data
The time-order effect observed during the No-Feedback condition of Experiment 1 replicated
earlier reports of what Fechner called ‘negative error’ [65]; i.e. the tendency to underestimate
the first of a pair of magnitude estimates. The absence of this effect in the Feedback condition
also lends credence to Jamieson and Petrusic’s [65] assertion that prior studies had failed to
elicit this effect on account of the feedback information participants were provided while per-
forming the task. Their suggestion that feedback encourages the adoption of biased decision
criteria seems consistent with the present findings, insofar as the introduction of feedback in
Experiment 1 abolished the order effect at the expense of first-order estimate accuracy (which
on average moved further away from the actual target bisection-point). The modulation of
first-order interval timing behaviour by external information pertaining to the accuracy of
Fig 8. Distribution (left panel) and intercorrelation (right panel) of O-LIFE subscale scores in Experiment 2. For box plots, thick horizontal line
indicates median subscale score; lower and upper hinges correspond to first and third quartiles, respectively; lower and upper whiskers extend to the
furthest score within 1.5 x interquartile range from the lower and upper hinges, respectively; points indicate outliers. For correlation plots, strength of
correlation indicated along Y-axis. UnEx: Unusual Experiences; CogDis: Cognitive Disorganisation; IntAn: Introspective Anhedonia; ImpNon:
Impulsive Nonconformity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191422.g008
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second-order temporal judgements (rather than direct feedback concerning the accuracy of
first-order estimates which we did not provide) supports our hypothesis that beliefs about
one’s temporal experience (i.e. metarepresentations of time) are capable of influencing the
underlying mechanisms involved in the processing of duration perception.
The lack of any systematic time-order effect in the suprasecond bisection task is, however,
inconsistent with Jamieson and Petrusic’s [65] study, which obtained analogous effects in the
suprasecond domain. Since the 3000 ms interval bisections reported in Experiment 2 were rel-
atively more consistent than those of the 1500 ms duration when absolute magnitude is taken
into account (see Fig 6), this result does not appear to be an artefact of greater estimation vari-
ability deriving from the scalar property. One possibility is that participants performing the
suprasecond task found it easier to compare the time that elapsed either side of the button
release, on account of the longer durations of these interval segments. That is, participants
may have benefitted from being able to integrate a relatively higher proportion of the temporal
information encoded in the suprasecond stimulus presentation as compared to the subsecond
stimulus presentation, thus enabling them to regulate their subsequent estimates more effec-
tively. In any case, we note that repetition effects are complex and heterogeneous phenomena,
insofar as various interacting (and sometimes opposing) factors can influence the extent to
which stimulus repetition suppresses (or enhances) neural responses[3, 72]. We argue that the
modified temporal-bisection task presented here offers an ideal paradigm for exploring the
subtle nuances of visual stimulus repetition effects on the experience of duration.
Personality data
Timing performance was correlated with O-LIFE subscale scores to investigate whether dis-
tinct profiles of schizotypy are associated with different patterns of duration estimation. On
the basis of previous research [15, 43], we were particularly interested in whether the Unusual
Experiences (UnEx) subscale could be used to identify distinct patterns of temporal
judgement.
The Likert-scaled O-LIFE data from Experiment 1 were in support of the hypothesised rela-
tion between UnEx and temporal judgements. Increased UnEx scores were associated with
less accurate estimates of the subsecond bisection-point, suggesting this feature of schizotypy
shares some degree of continuity with the interval timing disturbances reported in schizophre-
nia [73, 74]. However, this finding cannot be straightforwardly attributed to a noisier visual
processing stream per se, since these estimates were not systematically associated with greater
variability (as compared to individuals with lower UnEx scores). While high-UnEx individuals
might encode subsecond durations differently compared to others, this difference appears to
be relatively stable or consistent (at least within a single test session).
The additional observation that high-UnEx was associated with the diminished precision of
temporal metacognitive judgements, which persists even with the provision of performance
feedback, supported the hypothesis that patterns of first- and second-order temporal judge-
ments differ along the UnEx dimension. This finding suggests that high-UnEx individuals
may be less confident about the veridicality of their subjective experience of time, despite evi-
dence that their estimates of elapsed subsecond durations are on average no less precise than
those of others. This observation is consistent with evidence that college students who score
highly on measures of schizotypy complain of significant cognitive deficits, despite demon-
strating broadly normal levels of performance across a variety of cognitive domains [75].
The lack of any analogous relationship between UnEx and suprasecond timing perfor-
mance might be accounted for by several explanations. First, it is of course plausible that no
relationship exists between these variables in the suprasecond domain, and that the results of
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Experiment 1 are a product of largely independent subsecond timing mechanisms (this would
be consistent with the combined findings of Reed & Randell, [43] and Sarkin et al., [42]). This
explanation would suggest that individuals who show high degrees of UnEx might also be
expected to manifest subtle perturbations in other domains associated with the same underly-
ing (most notably, cerebellar [69]) networks, such as perceptual decision-making and motor
co-ordination [76, 77]
An alternative explanation is that subtle differences in temporal estimation and metacogni-
tion were not detected in Experiment 2 due to compensatory strategies enlisted by high-UnEx
participants. Given that suprasecond duration estimation is considered to be much more
dependent upon mechanisms such as attention and working memory than subsecond interval
timing [24, 69, 78], and that these neurocognitive functions are generally intact in university
students with high positive schizotypy scores [75, 79], it is possible that temporal processing
differences were obscured by use of cognitive strategies that augmented timing performance
(e.g., counting, increased attention to temporal information encoded within task stimuli, etc).
Indeed, this could explain why the only association between personality and task performance
was limited to the Cognitive Disorganisation (CogDis) dimension, since higher degrees of
CogDis might translate to the less effective deployment of such cognitive resources. One obvi-
ous way to test this hypothesis in future studies would be to introduce an additional task com-
ponent that increases cognitive load (e.g., a concurrent ‘distracter’ task), thus mitigating
against the recruitment of such performance-optimising strategies.
Another potential explanation for the differences observed in the two experiments is that
timing differences in nonclinical adults may be more reliably indicated by the conjunction of
certain personality features indexed by the UnEx and Impulsive Nonconformity (ImpNon)
subscales. It could be the case that the pattern of results found in Experiment 1 was the conse-
quence of sampling a relatively high proportion of individuals who covaried along both of
these dimensions. This explanation would go some way to explaining why previous attempts
to map interval timing distortions onto psychometrically-defined impulsivity [30–32] have so
far produced mixed results. It may be the case that timing differences amongst nonclinical
adults are at their most apparent when trait impulsivity co-occurs with the anomalous percep-
tual experiences and/or patterns of thought tapped by the UnEx scale (e.g., if certain patterns
of midbrain/frontal dopaminergic tone underlie the emergence of these personality features as
well as temporal processing disturbances). Recent research involving latent profile analysis has
indicated that neurocognitive functioning [80] and subjective wellbeing [81] are predicted by
specific combinatorial patterns of schizotypal trait expression, suggesting that the link between
personality traits and cognitive performance are very likely to be complex and nonlinear.
This being said, the findings of Experiment 2 suggest that the confluence of UnEx and
ImpNon trait expression was not associated with analogous differences in temporal judge-
ments in the suprasecond domain (at least for the 1500 ms target duration investigated in this
study). If the co-occurrence of UnEx and ImpNon trait characteristics do indeed index a com-
mon underlying mechanism that explains individual variance in temporal judgement, this sub-
tle effect would appear to be limited to the subsecond domain. This observation suggests to us
that the duration of the temporal interval (i.e. sub- vs. suprasecond), rather than personality
dimension combinatorics, is a more substantive source of interindividual differences in timing
performance and metacognitive accuracy in the context of trait schizotypy.
Metacognitive appraisal of estimate accuracy
Both experiments provided strong evidence that participants were able to discriminate what
they took to be their best estimate of the target bisection-point with some degree of consistency
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across trials. The ability to sort paired interval estimates according to the participant’s percep-
tion of time and to genuinely apply Ideal Observer analysis is one of the most valuable aspects
of the modified task. This feature of the paradigm enables analysis of the subset of temporal
estimates which participants consider to be the closest correlates of their own internal repre-
sentation of the target duration, thus filtering out extraneous variance introduced by motor
response errors and other sources of noise. Furthermore, we argue that partitioning estimate
variance in accordance with the participant’s metacognitive classification of their Best/Worst
estimates gives an implicit, objective index of the confidence with which they are able to intro-
spectively evaluate their own interval timing performance. This is to say that those participants
whose Subjective Best estimates fall within a narrower distribution demonstrate greater consis-
tency in their appraisal of their temporal estimates, while those who are less adept at discrimi-
nating which estimates fall closer to their subjective representation of the target duration (or
indeed, whose representation of the target duration itself varies more greatly from trial to trial)
will manifest greater variability on this index. In line with recent research on the behavioural
properties [51, 82–86] and neural representation [87] of confidence and uncertainty we main-
tain that the development of such objective, behaviour-based measures of performance
appraisal are essential for assessing the impact of metacognitive processes on duration
perception.
The Subjective Best variance does not depend on how closely the individual’s internal
representation of the target interval corresponds with the actual mid-point; rather, it indicates
how reliably a given subject bisected the interval over the course of the experiment. It should
be remarked however that Subjective Best variance is necessarily bounded by first-order esti-
mate variance, meaning that between-subject comparisons could be biased against those indi-
viduals whose baseline level of estimate variability is significantly elevated. We therefore
calculated the Metacognition Index to provide an indicator of subjective performance that is
proportionally scaled in relation to the individual spread of first-order estimates. Taken
together, bisection-point estimate variance, Subjective Best variance, and the Metacognitive
Index provide sufficient data to make reasoned inferences about the consistency of an individ-
ual’s temporal judgements at both the first- and second-order level, and the extent to which
performance on these task components can be dissociated.
The capacity to differentiate (dis)continuities between these factors is illustrated by the fol-
lowing two examples: In Experiment 1, UnEx and ImpNon were indicative of diminished tem-
poral metacognitive precision, despite the absence of any clear association between these
schizotypy dimensions and first-order estimate variance. In Experiment 2, CogDis was like-
wise positively correlated with Subjective Best variance, but the absence of any clear associa-
tion with the Metacognition Index, together with an almost identical relationship with
estimate variability, suggested there was little evidence of diminished temporal metacognitive
precision over and above the general tendency towards more variable estimation behaviour.
Conclusion
The modified temporal-bisection task is a novel paradigm for investigating individual differ-
ences in interval timing. This paradigm provides statistical information about the accuracy
and variability of paired interval estimates as a function of objective performance and the indi-
vidual’s subjective appraisal of their performance. This latter component of the task provides
an objective measure of temporal estimation confidence, which allows for a nuanced analysis
of temporal metacognitive processing. We have attempted to show how this paradigm can be
applied to differentiate individual differences in temporal judgements in terms of both dura-
tion estimation and metacognition. Taking schizotypy as a test case, we found evidence of a
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negative association between the Unusual Experiences personality dimension and the accuracy
of first- and second-order subsecond timing judgements. We did not however find evidence of
a similar effect in a suprasecond version of the task. This pattern of results is consistent with
previous studies investigating heterogeneity in temporal judgement as a function of psycho-
metrically-defined schizotypy.
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